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Abstract How do children discover which linguistic expressions are associated
with presuppositions? Do they take a direct strategy of tracking whether linguistic
expressions are associated with particular speaker presuppositions? This strategy
may fail children who are trying to learn about the presuppositions of so-called
“soft” presupposition triggers, which can be readily used even when the relevant
would-be presupposed content is not part of the common ground. We present a
corpus study with the soft trigger know and the related, but non-presuppositional
think. We find that a direct learning strategy would indeed run into problems for such
a soft trigger given the nature and availability of evidence in children’s linguistic
input.
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1 Introduction
How do children discover which linguistic expressions are associated with presup-
positions? The acquisition literature typically focuses on when children master
presupposition triggers (Falmagne, Gonsalves & Bennett-Lau 1994; Berger & Höhle
2012; Jasbi 2015; among many others), and remains mostly silent on how children
might achieve this (see Schulz 2003 for a notable exception). In the formal semantics
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Discovering the factivity of know
literature, when the “how” question is broached, the assumption is that children
figure out presupposed content by directly tracking what speakers presuppose when
using presupposition triggers (see for instance Matthewson 2006). But this as-
sumption seems to under-appreciate the difficulty of identifying triggers for several
reasons, not the least of which is that some triggers (Abusch’s “soft triggers”) are
often used when the presupposition that they would typically trigger is not common
knowledge.
In this paper, we focus on the soft trigger know, which as a factive verb is taken
to presuppose that the proposition expressed by its complement is true (Kiparsky
& Kiparsky 1970; Stalnaker 1974). We ask whether there is enough evidence in
children’s linguistic input to identify its presupposition using such a direct strat-
egy. We focus on know because it is particularly frequent in speech to children
(MacWhinney 2000) as compared to other presupposition triggers. In addition,
there is another high frequency attitude verb which is closely related to know but is
non-factive, and can serve as a comparison case: think. We ask whether children can
track speaker presuppositions in order to figure out that know is factive but that think
is not. Our results suggest that an acquisition route which relies on tracking whether
uses of know presuppose or entail its complement may fail, as they are relatively
indistinguishable from uses of think in this respect. We briefly point to alterative
routes to figuring out the factivity contrast, which rely on more indirect cues, such as
the syntactic distribution of these two verbs (syntactic bootstrapping) and the kinds
of indirect speech acts these verbs are typically used for (pragmatic bootstrapping).
2 Acquiring presupposition triggers
The most direct avenue to discover which words trigger presuppositions would be to
track the background assumptions that a speaker makes when using a presupposition
trigger:
(1) Pay attention to everything that speakers presuppose and notice that whenever
expression X is used, p is always common knowledge. Conclude that p is a
presupposition triggered by X.
This is essentially an extension of the associationist view of how the mapping
problem is solved for non-presupposed content (e.g., learning that apple means
APPLE). While this direct strategy is the most straightforward in principle, it could
prove particularly challenging for presupposed content. For one, presuppositions
are — by their nature — backgrounded: they might thus fly under the learners’ radar.
Furthermore, speakers make many presuppositions when they speak that are not
conventionally associated with any particular expression (Stalnaker 1974). Soft
triggers present a further challenge for this strategy, in that their presuppositions
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seem to be easily defeasible. If speakers fail to consistently presuppose the relevant
presupposition, children may need to rely on other routes to identify the trigger.
3 Factivity: semantic and pragmatic background
3.1 Theories of presupposition triggering
The literature on presupposition triggering asks how different expressions get to
be associated with their presuppositions, and two main types of accounts have
emerged. Semantic accounts, following Strawson (1950) and Frege (1948), define
presuppositions according to patterns of entailment. For example, if a sentence
presupposes p, then the question of the sentence’s truth can only arise if p is true.
Adopting this perspective, authors such as Karttunen (1974), Heim (1983), and
Van der Sandt (1992) treat presuppositions as constraints imposed on the conver-
sational context that are arbitrarily specified in the lexicon. In contrast, pragmatic
accounts of presupposition treat them as constraints on what the speaker can do
with a presupposition trigger and the conditions that must be met in order to felici-
tously and successfully utter sentences with this trigger (Stalnaker 1974; Kempson
1975; Wilson 1975; Boër & Lycan 1976; Karttunen & Peters 1977; Levinson 1983;
Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 2000; Kadmon 2001; Simons 2001, 2003; Abrusán
2011).
These two types of accounts are not mutually exclusive because accepting one
type of account for a particular trigger does not preclude accepting the alternative
for other triggers. While the original Stalnakerian view leaves open the possibility
that all presupposition triggering is pragmatic, Stalnaker himself admits that some
presuppositions may need to be arbitrarily specified in the lexicon and the recent
pragmatic accounts of presuppositions all concern soft triggers, and aim at capturing
the ease with which their presuppositions can be canceled, in comparison with those
of hard triggers. One prominent view for hard triggers is that the presupposed content
is anaphoric. Hence presuppositions may form a heterogeneous class (although see
Abrusán 2016).
3.2 Cognitive vs. emotive factives
Factives can be roughly divided into two classes: cognitive factives and emotive
factives. Cognitive factives (e.g., realize, discover, forget) take true complements,
and the truth of the complement is furthermore typically presupposed ((Kiparsky &
Kiparsky 1970). Cognitive factives are a prime example of soft triggers, given that
their presuppositions are easily defeasible (see 2 from Karttunen 1971).
(2) If I realize later that I have not told the truth, I will confess it to everyone.
602
Discovering the factivity of know
Emotive factives (e.g., regret, hate, be happy) have an additional entailment that
the subject has an emotional attitude towards that complement. Emotive factives
background not only the truth of their complement, like cognitive factives, but also
that their subject believes the complement to be true (3).
(3) John hates that it is raining.
While cognitive factives are generally assumed to be soft triggers, the status of
emotive factives is more controversial. Abbott (2006) assumes that they are hard
triggers, while Simons (2007) and Abrusán (2011), take all factives are soft triggers.
The status of know is also controversial. Its presupposition seems less easily
cancelable than that of cognitive factives (compare 4 to 2).
(4) If I know later that I have not told the truth, I will confess it to everyone.
Yet its presupposition is often not contextually-supported (5), at least in naturalistic
speech between adults. Utterances of x knows p can be used when the addressee has
no reason to take the truth of the complement for granted: discourse initial uses of
x knows p are felicitous and the majority of uses of x knows p in speech between
adults are, in fact, “informative” in that they provide hearers with new information
(Spenader 2003). Second, Simons (2007) shows that the complement of know can
provide content which addresses the QUD (6). And lastly, p does not always project
out of family-of-sentences contexts with x knows p, as in examples provided by
Beaver (2010), including (7).
(5) a. Did you know that John won the lottery? (uttered discourse initially)
b. No, I didn’t. That’s amazing!
(6) a. Where was Louise yesterday?
b. I know from Henry that she was in Princeton. (from Simons 2007)
(7) . . . I haven’t tried this with wombats though, and if anyone discovers that the
method is also wombat-proof, I’d really like to know. (Beaver, 2010, ex. 32)
To make matters even more difficult for the language-learning child, the cluster of
properties in (5-7) might make know seem no different from a non-factive verb like
think— at least with respect to its status as a presupposition trigger. To compare
with know, think can also be used to provide new information (8), to address the
QUD (9), and the complement of think can even appear to project, even when
the complement of know does not (see 10 modified slightly from Simons, Beaver,
Roberts & Tonhauser 2017).
(8) I think that Mary won the lottery! (uttered discourse initially)
(9) a. Where’s Mary?
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b. I think she’s at home.
(10) Q: Why is it taking Phil so long to get back here?
A: He doesn’t know that the car’s parked in the garage!
A’: He doesn’t think that the car’s parked in the garage!
3.3 Theories of factivity
Any account of cognitive factives must capture the ease with which their presupposi-
tions are canceled. For semantic accounts, where presuppositions are conventionally
associated with the factive trigger, this would mean that the presuppositions are
often accommodated locally (Heim 1983). For pragmatic accounts, cancellation is
expected because presuppositions are conversationally derived.
Several pragmatic accounts of factivity (Stalnaker 1974; Simons 2001) propose
that factive sentences like (11) have (at least) two relevant entailments: a doxastic en-
tailment (x believes p) that is typically foregrounded (12a) and a veridical entailment
(p) which is typically backgrounded (12b).
(11) John knows that Mary is home.
(12) a. John has the belief that Mary is home.
b. Mary is home.
For Stalnaker (1974), both of these entailments cannot be put forward at once given
that they are independent of each other, so — to be orderly — one of the entailments
gets backgrounded. Following Stalnaker, several authors have tried to provide
accounts for why p gets backgrounded (Simons 2001; Abusch 2002, 2010; Abrusán
2011; Tonhauser, Beaver, Roberts & Simons 2013; Simons et al. 2017, among
others). Abrusán (2011) argues for a default grammatical main point: any entailment
about the running time of the main event is “main point”, while other entailments
get backgrounded, unless they are targeted by the QUD or focus. For Abusch (2002,
2010), be aware and know evoke the lexical alternative be unaware. Since both
alternatives entail p, it follows that p is true, under the defeasible assumption that at
least one of the alternatives is true. Simons et al. (2017) propose a similar account
that derives the relevant alternatives pragmatically instead of lexically.
If pragmatic accounts are on the right track, they provide a a potentially easier
avenue for the learnability problem as compared to semantic accounts: all that the
child would need to figure out is that x knows p both entails x believes p and p, and
could then rely on some principled pragmatic reasoning to figure out that — all else
equal — p typically gets backgrounded. The learnability challenge would then be to
figure out the (non-)veridicality of the verbs — that x knows p entails p, but that x
thinks p doesn’t. As we will see, the actual exposure that children receive with know
and think shows that even this is not trivial.
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4 Corpus study
4.1 Hypotheses
In acquiring a word like know and its non-factive counterpart think, the child faces a
complex task. Children must determine that know both entails and backgrounds the
truth of its complement, while think does not. The earliest that some children have
been found to reliably differentiate know and think in terms of their (non-)factivity is
3 years of age, but many children do not reliably distinguish the verbs until they are
over 4 years old (Dudley, Orita, Hacquard & Lidz 2015; Hacquard, Dudley, Baron &
Lidz 2016; among others). How do children figure out the two differences between
know and think, namely that know is both veridical and factive while think is neither,
even at such young ages?
One avenue would be to try and directly observe the status of the verbs’ comple-
ments within a discourse, as discussed in (13) and (14).
(13) discourse status cues to (non-)veridicality: Pay attention to everything that
speakers say in using know and think, as well as what is true in the context of
utterance. Observe that p is always true when x knows p is uttered, but not
necessarily when x thinks p is uttered. Conclude that know entails the truth
of its complement and that think does not.
(14) discourse status cues to (non-)factivity: Pay attention to everything that
speakers presuppose in using know and think. Notice that whenever x knows
p is used, p is always common knowledge but not whenever x thinks p is
uttered. Conclude that p is a presupposition triggered by x knows p but not x
thinks p.
Laying out these potential discourse status cues immediately raises two issues. First,
can children even track these types of information as they unfold in conversation,
and do they actively do so? Second, does the input provide a clear enough signal in
order to achieve the adult-like generalization about know and think? In this paper,
we leave the first issue for future work, and attempt to address the second issue.
Previous empirical work suggests that these cues are not likely to appear in speech
to children, at least if adults speak to children in much the same way that they speak
to each other (Spenader 2003; Beaver 2010), but no study to date has explicitly
evaluated the reliability of cues like (13) and (14) in children’s linguistic input.
4.1.1 Predictions
How reliable are discourse status cues to veridicality and factivity in speech to
children? If the veridicality cues in (13) are available, we should expect to find data
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like those in (15), and if the factivity cues in (14) are available, we should expect to
find data like those in (16).
(15) Informative cues as to think’s non-veridicality: unlike know, think can be
used to talk about false beliefs as well as true beliefs. As a result, informative
cases would be utterances of sentences whose complements the speaker takes
to be false.
a. She thinks Bill is coming to the party (...but isn’t she silly?)
b. I thought Bill was coming to the party (...but then I saw his RSVP.)
(16) Informative cues as to know’s factivity: as compared with x thinks p utter-
ances, x knows p utterances should more often describe information which is
familiar to the interlocutors. Additionally, projective contexts, if available,
could be helpful. For example, the following cases could be helpful for notic-
ing that uses of know presuppose or entail the the truth of the complement:
a. Bill is coming to the party! Oh, does Mary know he’s coming?
b. Bill is coming to the party! Oh, I didn’t know that!
4.2 Methodology
To investigate which cues to factivity are made available to children, we examined
tokens of know and think in child ambient speech from the Gleason corpus in
CHILDES (Masur & Gleason 1980; MacWhinney 2000). The Gleason corpus is
comprised of conversations between 24 target children and their families recorded
in the late 1970s in the Boston area. The ages of the target children in this corpus
range from 2-5 years, the average age is about 3.5. The corpus includes dinner
conversations in the home, as well as two separate play sessions in a laboratory
setting between each parent-child dyad. During these play sessions, each dyad was
required to complete three activities: working with a toy car that could be taken
apart and put back together; reading a picture book with no words; and playing with
a grocery store set.
Know and think were relatively frequent in this corpus. We identified 1231
tokens of know and 1156 tokens of think. On average, each child might hear know
sentences 17 times per conversation and think sentences 16 times per conversation.
Know occurred in 3.7% and think in 3.5% of all child ambient utterances.
4.3 Coding scheme
Our coding scheme was designed to assess what information is made available about
the discourse status of the complements to know and think, by measuring syntactic
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properties of know and think tokens which serve as proxies as well as their relation-
ship to the surrounding discourse. We examined the types of subjects (1st person,
2nd person, other), tense (present, past, other), negation (present, absent), comple-
ments (declarative, interrogative, noun phrase, prepositional phrase, non-overt, etc.)
and types of clauses (declarative, interrogative) that the verbs occur with as well
as the status of the information that their declarative complements express (17-19).
Syntax-level codes (i.e., subject, tense, negation, complement, clause, projective
contexts) were made based on examining the utterance in isolation and therefore in
the absence of any information about the surrounding discourse. Discourse-level
codes (i.e., status of information in complement clauses) were made on a subset of
the utterances, as applicable. For these codes, 50 lines of the preceding discourse
and 5 lines of the following dialogue were examined in order to establish a discourse
context against which the utterance was evaluated. In most cases, this was more than
necessary to determine what code to provide.
Status of information in complement clause
(17) old: information that has been previously mentioned in the discourse and
accepted into the common ground1
...
mother: Because they’re working in there.
mother: And they don’t want you to come there now.
mother: After when they’re finished you can come there.
father: They will be happy to have you.
sister: And me finished.
mother: I know you’re finished, Rachi.
...
(18) new: information that has not been previously mentioned, or is uttered out-
of-the-blue2
...
child: You could have hot dogs.
father: Not for breakfast.
1 example from conversation with John (4;2) at dinner, participants include the target child, his mother,
his father and his sister
2 example from conversation with Isadora (3;7) during grocery-set play interaction, participants include
the target child and her father
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child: Mhm.
father: Well.
father: Look.
father: I know I want some milk.
...
(19) unclear: information that has not been explicitly mentioned and accepted into
the common ground, but which could be shared by the interlocutors, because
of world knowledge, family routines, children’s habits and preferences, or
which could be inferred from the previous discourse3
...
mother: Would you like a story?
child: What, Mama?
mother: Would you like a story?
child: Yeah.
mother: I saw a little tiny book over here.
mother: And I know you like little books.
...
All utterances were coded by the first author and a subset were checked by
one of two undergraduate research assistants. Different procedures were carried
out for syntax-level codes and discourse codes due to the sample sizes available.
For the majority of the syntax-level coding categories, 98% or more of the tokens
were included in the reliability check. Since the reliability statistics were so high
for each category, only 80% or more of the tokens were included for the last two
syntactic-level categories to be checked (tense-type and complement-type). For all
syntax-level categories, intercoder agreement was high (.99 < κ < .80). For the one
discourse-level category, 100% of the relevant tokens were included in the reliability
check, given that only approximately 11% of the entire sample was eligible for
discourse-level coding. For this discourse-level category, intercoder agreement was
not high (κ = .44). Arguably, this reflects how hard it is to track propositions within
a naturalistic parent-child discourse and determine whether they express information
that is part of the common ground or new to (some of) the interlocutors. We return
to this issue in the results section.
3 example from conversation with Victor (2;3) during picture-book play interaction, participants include
the target child and his mother
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4.4 Results
Results for the syntactic-level coding categories are provided in Table 1. Results for
the discourse-level coding category are provided in Figure 1.
4.4.1 Veridicality data
First, we examined whose beliefs were under discussion in using know and think
by tracking the subjects that occur with each verb — as an indication of whether
the conversational participants took them to be true or false. We find that the
verbs are most often used with subjects that refer to the conversational participants,
given that subjects which were not first or second person occurred in less than
10% of tokens for either verb. This indicates that the beliefs under discussion are
typically those of the interlocutors: the speaker (usually a parent, but sometimes
another family member or experimenter) and an addressee (sometimes the target
child and sometimes another person present); the beliefs of someone external to
the conversation are rarely discussed. Furthermore, know occurs primarily with
second person subjects (61% of all know tokens), think occurs primarily with first
person subjects (61% of all think tokens). These data also suggest that there is a
difference in whose beliefs are discussed with know vs. think. A chi-square test of
independence was performed to determine the relationship between subject-types
and verbs. The relation between these variables was significant, χ2 (2, N = 2387) =
236.1, p < .00001. Speaker’s beliefs were discussed most with think and addressee’s
beliefs were discussed most with know.
Given that think is most often used to express the speaker’s beliefs, we next
asked how often these beliefs are described as currently held beliefs. We thus looked
at the types of tense that occurred with the verbs. We find that both verbs occur most
often in the present tense (95% of know tokens and 91% of think tokens). Past tense
tokens of either verb were infrequent; these forms occur in only 4% of know tokens
and 8% of think tokens. This indicates that the beliefs under discussion when using
either verb are most often beliefs that hold at the time of utterance.
Pulling together these data, a particular picture of children’s experience with
think emerges. Think is often used in first person tokens in the present tense. These
I think p tokens (which make up 47.6% of children’s input with think) cannot be
used to report a false belief. What about the rest? We’ve already seen that there
are very few third person subjects, but 30% of all think tokens have second person
subjects. Out of these think tokens, 13.6% are questions like What do you think? and
11.9% questions like Do you think that p?. Such questions asking for the addressee’s
opinion are unlikely to be uttered in contexts in which p is false, but rather used to
ask p? with the assumption that the addressee might have the answer. Given the
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the majority of think tokens (approximately 75%) are these I think p or what do you
think? or do you think p? tokens, there are few opportunities to observe think as
reporting a false belief overall.
subject tense negation
verb 1st 2nd other present past other present absent
know .34 .61 .05 .95 .04 .01 .28 .72
think .61 .30 .09 .91 .08 .01 .11 .89
complement clause
verb CP - Q CP + Q NP PP null decl. wh-inter. polar inter.
know .15 .52 .06 - .26 .50 .49 .01
think .85 - - .04 .10 .64 .20 .16
Table 1 Syntactic contexts data: proportion of tokens in each category per verb
4.4.2 Factivity data
To determine how often speakers presuppose p with x thinks p vs. x knows p, we
first had to isolate the relevant think and know tokens, namely those with declarative
complements.4 In our corpus there were 796 x thinks p tokens and only 131 x knows
p tokens, given that the majority of know tokens had either interrogative or null
complements (for more details, see Dudley 2017).5
Given that we had only 131 x knows p tokens (only 11% of all know tokens in
the sample), we used all of them in the subsequent analyses, as well as an equivalent
sample of x thinks p tokens (128 tokens or 11% of total think tokens). For these
tokens, we examined the transcripts that they came from to determine how often p
expressed information that was part of the common ground, using the discourse-
level coding categories discussed above. Due to disagreement between coders, data
for this coding category was re-categorized to provide the most generous estimate
of what information was old. As reported here, “old” data includes the union of
utterances which either coder marked as old; “new” data includes the intersection of
4 Declarative complements were isolated because factives do not presuppose the truth of their comple-
ment when the complement is a noun, preposition or embedded question, and because we could not
be sure to recover the right complement type for null, or non-expressed, complements.
5 We also filtered out tokens with declarative complements if they were in wh-questions or if part
of the complement was unintelligible (marked in CHILDES transcripts as “xxx”) such that the
corresponding proposition was unrecoverable.
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Figure 1 Status of the complements within the sample, as a proportion of x verbs
p tokens for each verb
utterances which both coders marked as new, and “unclear” data includes all other
utterances (i.e., those that were marked as new by one coder and unclear by the other
coder).
Even with this generous classification, we found that the complements of both x
thinks p and x knows p tokens rarely expressed information that had been previously
mentioned in the conversation and accepted into the common ground. In our sample,
p described old information in only 15% of all x knows p tokens and 14% of all x
thinks p tokens. Unclear and new tokens were far more frequent, and occurred in
different proportions for the two verbs. For x thinks p tokens in our sample, p most
often described new information (59% of the tokens), while x knows p tokens were
most often unclear tokens (47% of the tokens). A chi-square test was performed to
determine the relationship between the two verbs and the status of their complements.
The relation between these variables was significant, χ2 (2, N = 259) = 12.59, p <
.002. Declarative complements more often expressed new information with think
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than with know.
However, we might want to ask if these patterns — while statistically signifi-
cant — are also cognitively significant for children or can help them learn something
about the factivity of know vs. the non-factivity of think. Does this kind of input
distribution support the learning strategy that factives have complements which
express common ground information, given that x knows p tokens are so rare, that
x thinks p tokens are so frequent, and that p expresses “old” information at similar
rates for the two verbs? To determine this, we analyzed the cue validity of a com-
plement expressing “old” information for determining which verbs are factive.6 In
our sample, the probability of getting a know token given an “old” token is only .15,
while the probability for think is .85. Thus our sample suggests that using declarative
complements which express common ground information as a cue to factivity would
lead the learner to sooner conclude that think is factive than that know is factive, due
to the similar rates of “old” tokens for the two verbs and the fact that such cases are
overwhelmingly more frequent for think than know.
Furthermore, to give a sense of what children are dealing with if they rely solely
on this kind of cue, we can look at how often cues like this occur. Less than 20 tokens
in the entire sample were x knows p tokens where p expressed “old” information.
This corresponds to 1.5% of all know tokens in this sample. If this is indicative of
the representative of children’s experience, then children could expect to observe
5-6 such informative examples in every 10,000 utterances that they hear. Given
estimates by Akhtar, Callanan, Pullum & Scholz (2004) based on data from Hart
& Risley (1995), this would amount to approximately 1,500 such utterances by the
point that children are beginning to differentiate between know and think at age 3.
But such calculations should be taken with a grain of salt given the nature of corpus
data and the size of our sample here.
Now, if we want to be more generous to these kinds of cues, we can include the
“unclear” cases (19) as tokens that can be classified as common knowledge from
the perspective of the child. If so, we find that know occurs more often with known
information (old/unclear in 62% of x knows p tokens) whereas think occurs more
often with new information (new in 59% of x thinks p tokens). Think tends to be used
with complements which express new information while know tends to be used with
complements that express known information. However, the cue validity statistic
does not improve much with this generous grouping: the cue validity for know only
rises to .20 while think’s lowers to .80 (as compared to .15 and .85, respectively).
Finally, we also examined how often these x knows p tokens occurred in p-family
contexts which could be informative about the projection behavior of know. We
6 A cue validity statistic expresses the reliability of a particular cue for identifying some category
as a conditional probability with a value ranging between 0 on the low end and 1 on the high end
(Brunswik 1956; Gibson 1966).
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found that out of the 131 x knows p tokens, only 50 of them (36%) occurred in
projective contexts and they were exclusively under negation and question operators
(with no conditional or modal contexts).
Now, there are some important caveats in considering our data. Our discourse-
level coders failed to become reliable (κ = .44). This could be taken to suggest that
our coding scheme was not appropriate to handle this task. It could also be taken
to suggest that this task — tracking whether propositions are new or known given
some prior discourse — is actually quite difficult given the kinds of discourses that
parents and children participate in. It is suggestive that children might have similar
difficulty as our coders in deciding what the status of p is when they hear x knows p
or x thinks p.
4.4.3 Discourse status of the complement vs. other cues to factivity
With this corpus study, we investigated the reliability of discourse status cues to the
factivity and veridicality distinctions between know and think in children’s linguistic
input. We asked two specific questions: (i) how often is think used to describe false
beliefs as compared to know and (ii) how often is know used to describe known
information as compared with think.
To answer the first question, we find that think is typically used to discuss the
speaker beliefs. Moreover, these first person think sentences were rarely used in
the past or with negation. This data suggests that think is rarely used to report false
beliefs. This indicates that, in children’s experience, speakers are often committed
to the truth of the complements of think (see also Diessel & Tomasello 2001; Lewis,
Hacquard & Lidz 2017; among others). As a result, there may be very few instances
where a child could observe that think can be used to describe false beliefs and is
thus non-veridical.
To answer the second question, we found that there was a difference in how often
know vs. think was used to describe discourse-old vs. new information. But this
difference (approx. a 40% - 60% split under the most generous estimates) was not of
the kind that we would expect if children need to use the discourse status route. In
fact, our analyses suggest that this kind of learning strategy might lead the learner to
conclude that think is factive over know, which is not consistent with findings in the
acquisition literature (Dudley et al. 2015; Hacquard et al. 2016). And we find that
projective contexts are rare with these x knows p tokens, suggesting that they might
not be the most readily available context from which to learn about the factivity of
know.
Whether children are able to make use of these subtle differences in the discourse
status of the complements of think and know remains an open question for the future
research. For now, the fact that they are so subtle motivates looking to alternative
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routes for figuring out the factivity contrast between know and think.
One possibility would be to use the syntactic distribution of the two verbs to
infer their meaning, and in particular the kinds of complements that they select for
(declarative complements almost exclusively for think, interrogative and declarative
complements for know). Such syntactic bootstrapping (Gleitman 1990) requires
that the link between a verb meaning and its syntactic distribution be principled,
in ways that learners can be privy to. To use this route, children must: (i) track
syntactic distributions in their input, (ii) notice differences in the distributions of
know and think and (iii) be able to reason about this difference using principled
syntax-semantics links, such as between question-embedding and factivity (see Egré
2008; among others). Can children do this? We have growing support from other
cases of attitude verb acquisition that syntactic bootstrapping is at play (Harrigan,
Hacquard & Lidz 2016; Lidz, Dudley & Hacquard 2016), but not for a contrast of
this grain size.
Another route would be to exploit the pragmatic function that these verbs are
typically used for (Hacquard 2014; Hacquard & Lidz 2016; Dudley 2017). Know is
often used to ask indirect questions (e.g. Do you know where my keys are?), think is
often used to make indirect assertions (e.g., I think they’re in your purse). If a child
understand that with “do you know Q?”, her parent is really asking her “Q?”, she
might infer that know relates the subject to the true answer to Q, as a point of entry
as to its factivity. Similarly, if she understands that assertions of “I think p” are really
indirect assertions of “p”, she might infer that the subject of think is committed
to the truth of p and that she assumes that it isn’t already common knowledge. In
order to use such pragmatic bootstrapping, children must: (i) track the intentions
of their interlocutors, (ii) track the words used by their interlocutors, (iii) notice
relationships between them and (iv) reason about the nature of those relationships
via pragmatics-semantics links. Can children do this? There is some evidence are
sensitive to the assertivity of think (Urmson 1952; Hooper 1975; Shatz, Wellman &
Silber 1983; Diessel & Tomasello 2001; Lewis, Hacquard & Lidz 2013; Lewis et al.
2017) and to the speaker’s intentions in performing other indirect requests (Gelman
& Shatz 1977; Shatz 1978), but we do not yet have the same evidence for know.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we made a first attempt at developing and testing hypotheses about how
children learn about the distinction in meaning between know and think. Know is
veridical and entails the truth of its complement, while think is non-factive and thus
does not. Furthermore, know is factive and presupposes the truth of its complement,
while think is non-factive and thus does not. One acquisition hypothesis would be
the learner uncovers these distinctions by trying to observe the direct consequences
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of them: if the learner can keep track of the status of each verbs’ complements
within a discourse, they may be able to infer whether that verb entails or presupposes
the truth of its complement. Our findings cast doubt that such a direct strategy
which uses cues about the discourse status of complements will be viable for the
case of know and think. First, utterances of think p often occur with a first person
subject, and used to proffer p. This could neutralize the traces of any veridicality
distinction between it and know. Second, speakers do not systematically utter know
p in situations where p is a part of the common ground, potentially neutralizing any
trace of the factivity distinction between the two verbs. Our corpus data provide the
first detailed investigation of such concerns in child-ambient speech and suggest that
these fears are founded.
Our data suggest that children do not have many opportunities to observe that
speakers presuppose p, when they hear know. This is because x knows p utterances are
relatively rare, and when they occur, they are not systematically used to presuppose
the truth of p. As a result, the child may not have reliable opportunities to observe
that know is used to talk about established information — or facts — whereas think is
not. If these data are reflective of children’s experience generally, then there is some
signal in the relatively few instances they get to learn from, but this signal is very
noisy. If a child could use these cues, it would be via probabilistic reasoning about
slight differences in proportions within their experience; children would have to
actively entertain factivity as a hypothesis and the learning trajectory would be slow
because the data would have to accrue over a long period of time. There are however
alternatives to this direct route which would rely on other kinds of evidence that is
widely available in children’s linguistic input. We briefly discussed two possible
routes, one which exploits the syntactic distribution of these two verbs, and one
which exploits their typical pragmatic function.
In principle, each of these routes are possible, but which one is actually taken?
Multiple sources of information may be necessary for solving such difficult learning
problems (Gleitman, Cassidy, Nappa, Papafragou & Trueswell 2005). And perhaps
each route is viable and children utilize whichever one is made most available to
them in their individual experience. We are currently conducting a follow-up study
to gain some experimental insight into which set(s) of cues are related to children’s
understanding of factivity. For preliminary results, see Dudley (2017).
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